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Abstract— Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are characterized by 
the interplay between digital and physical spaces. This 
characteristic has extended the attack surface that could be 
exploited by an offender to cause harm. An increasing number 
of cyber-physical incidents may occur depending on the 
configuration of the physical and digital spaces and their 
interplay. Traditional investigation processes are not adequate 
to investigate these incidents, as they may overlook the 
extended attack surface resulting from such interplay, leading 
to relevant evidence being missed and testing flawed 
hypotheses explaining the incidents. The software engineering 
research community can contribute to addressing this 
problem, by deploying existing formalisms to model digital and 
physical spaces, and using analysis techniques to reason about 
their interplay and evolution. In this paper, we use a 
motivating example to describe some emerging software 
engineering challenges to support investigations of cyber-
physical incidents. We review and critique existing research 
proposed to address these challenges, and sketch an initial 
solution based on a meta-model to represent cyber-physical 
incidents and a representation of the topology of digital and 
physical spaces that supports reasoning about their interplay. 
Keywords-component; Digital Investigation; Cyber-Physical 
Systems; CPS; Incidents. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate computation, 
communication, and physical processes for the purpose of 
creating systems that are more capable, collaborative, and 
autonomous [1]. Applications of CPS [2] can be found in 
various domains including industrial control, transportation, 
and healthcare systems. This integration enables the interplay 
between the digital and physical spaces as events happening 
in the digital space can have an impact in both the physical 
and digital spaces and vice-versa. For example, in a smart 
building, a rise in the measured temperature of a room will 
trigger a digital process to issue a command to an air 
conditioner to start cooling the room. 
Incidents occurring in CPS are increasing in number and 
sophistication as such systems become more pervasive [3]. 
Many of these incidents have caused significant damage to 
both digital and physical assets. For example, in the 
Ukrainian power grid incident [4], computer networks of 
three energy distribution companies were exploited to reach 
devices that control electricity distribution, and subsequently 
disable them by using a malware. This incident caused a 
power outage for about 225,000 customers over several 
areas. 
Digital investigation process is identified as the use of 
scientific methods for the purpose of preserving, collecting, 
validating, identifying, analyzing, interpreting, documenting, 
and presenting digital evidence obtained from various digital 
resources to facilitate criminal events reconstruction or to 
predict unauthorized events that can cause harm [5]. 
Traditional investigation processes may not be adequate to 
investigate cyber-physical incidents, as they may overlook 
the extended attack surface of CPS. In particular, as cyber-
physical incidents have only emerged in recent years, 
investigators might not be able to rely on their previous 
experience to explain how incidents have occurred. 
Moreover, investigative software tools are not developed 
with the aim to collect and analyze evidence related to 
incidents exploiting the interplay between digital and 
physical spaces (hereafter referred as interplay). As a 
consequence, investigators are prone to overlooking relevant 
evidence and may formulate flawed hypotheses explaining 
the incident. 
In this paper, we argue that the activities performed 
during investigations of cyber-physical incidents should be 
driven by the interplay that the target CPS inhabits. To 
achieve this aim, we envision a solution building on existing 
research proposed within the software engineering 
community. In particular, modeling formalisms [6] have 
been developed to represent digital and physical spaces, and 
also analysis techniques [7] have been applied to reason 
about their interplay and evolution. In this paper, we use a 
motivating example of a cyber-physical incident to motivate 
our problem and describe the software engineering 
challenges to support investigations of such incidents. We 
also review some of the relevant literature that has been 
proposed to address these challenges. Moreover, we sketch 
an initial solution based on a meta-model to represent cyber-
physical incidents and a representation of the topology of 
digital and physical spaces to reason about their interplay. 
Both representations will potentially enable reasoning about 
how cyber-physical incidents can occur and thus support 
some of the activities of an investigation. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes our motivating example. Section 3 discusses the 
software engineering challenges and their corresponding 
related research. Section 4 describes our initial solution and 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE 
We motivate the problem of traditional investigations of 
cyber-physical incidents by presenting an incident scenario 
that could take place in a smart building. Fig. 1 represents 
the physical and digital spaces in which the incident can 
occur as well as the steps of the incident scenario. 
As shown at the bottom of Fig. 1, the physical space is 
the 2nd floor plan of a research center. The floor plan is 
composed of a server room containing servers storing 
sensitive information (e.g., secret formulas), an HVAC 
(Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning), and a fire 
detector. The floor also has a toilet containing smart lighting 
devices, and a control room containing a workstation 
through which building administrators can monitor and 
configure the operations of the devices through the IP 
network. The HVAC, the fire detector and the lighting 
devices are from the same vendor are connected to an 
installation bus adopting the KNX protocol [8]. The 
installation bus allows the devices to communicate between 
themselves, and also to send data (e.g., temperature) through 
the bus network to control processes (lighting, temperature, 
and alarm) running elsewhere. These processes use the 
received data to determine the status of the system, and issue 
commands to the physical devices to control certain 
properties of the environment (e.g., adjust the temperature). 
Data received by the control processes as well as the 
commands they issue are stored securely in a database and 
can be accessed by the building administrators through the 
workstation. 
As shown at the top of Fig. 1, the digital space of the 
smart building is composed of the control processes 
(temperature, alarm, and lighting), the database in which 
sensor data are stored, and the IP and Bus networks. 
In our example, the offender is a visitor who causes the 
incident by performing the following steps. 1) The visitor 
reaches the research floor and goes to the toilet. 2) She then 
connects her laptop to the installation bus (e.g., by exploiting 
proximity to the smart lights). 3) Subsequently, she collects 
data transmitted over the bus, and uses it to identify the 
devices in the floor through their physical source address, 
which is a 16-bit field containing information about the area, 
line, and device numbers. 4) She locates the devices in the 
server room by analyzing collected data. 5) The offender 
then sends special malware to the devices in the server room. 
This malware exploits vulnerabilities, such as those present 
in Trane HVACs [9], to compromise and disable the HVAC 
and the fire detector. 6) Simultaneously, the offender sends 
tampered temperature measurement data to the temperature 
control process on behalf of the fire detector and the HVAC 
in order to hide the temperature increase in the server room. 
Finally, the servers heat up, damaging or losing the 
information they store. 
Offenders can exploit the interplay in other ways. For 
example, an offender can get access to the IP network and 
send emails containing malware to employees. The malware 
can be embedded within a Microsoft Office document, and  
can exploit the macro functionality to install itself on the 
target machine, similarly to what happened in the Ukrainian 
incident [4]. The malware can subsequently compromise the 
smart devices that are controlled by the compromised target 
machine. 
The interplay in the smart building has extended the 
attack surface. The physical reachability to the floor, the 
physical connectivity to the installation bus, and lack of 
security measures (e.g., encryption of transmitted data) in the 
KNX protocol gave the offender digital accessibility to the 
HVAC. Additionally, the interplay allows the propagation of 
an incident’s impact from one component to others 
(cascaded impact). For example, the malware compromised 
the HVAC and the fire detector leading to a raise in the 
server room’s temperature, consequently damaging the 
servers. The interplay enabled new and unusual interactions 
between different digital and physical components in the 
smart building (e.g., physical damage to the servers is caused 
through digital connectivity to the installation bus). Thus, 
investigators may overlook these interactions and 
consequently ignore relevant evidence such as transmission 
delays of KNX traffic between the smart light in the toilet 
and the lighting control process. Moreover, some data might 
not be available for examination because it is only stored in 
volatile memory (traffic transmitted over bus network) or 
might be tampered with by an offender. Hence this data 
might be lost if not preserved proactively. As a consequence, 
Figure 1. Digital and physical spaces of a smart building in which 
our incident example can take place. 
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an investigation can reach flawed conclusions. For example, 
the investigators may hypothesize that the servers were 
damaged due to a hardware failure, since they did not find 
any evidence indicating the occurrence of a physical incident 
(e.g., break and entry into the server room) or a cyber 
incident (e.g., a malware was installed in the server). 
III. RESEARCH CHALLENGES 
To address the problems described in the previous section 
it is necessary to provide awareness of how an incident can 
take place in a CPS, particularly how it can exploit the 
interplay. Thus analysis techniques should be applied on the 
representation of CPS to reason about how the interplay can 
be exploited by an offender to cause an incident. Analysis 
techniques can also help investigators to support event 
reconstruction in order to formulate and test robust incident 
hypotheses. Moreover, a system should be “ready” before an 
investigation of an incident is needed. This is referred to as 
forensic readiness that is the capability of a system to be 
prepared for future incident investigations by proactively 
collecting and storing potential evidence in a way that can 
maximize its use, while minimizing the costs of an 
investigation [10]. However, to date, only general 
organizational guidelines have been provided to achieve 
forensic readiness. Little or no attention has been given to 
how forensic-ready software systems can be designed 
systematically. 
We now identify some software engineering challenges 
related to i) representing CPS and cyber-physical incidents 
and reasoning about how incidents can occur; ii) event 
reconstruction and iii) forensic-readiness requirements. For 
each challenge we also review existing related research and 
provide an illustration of the challenge with reference to our 
motivating example. The last subsection focuses on specific 
challenges related to engineering CPS that are forensic-
ready. 
A. Representing and Reasoning About CPS & Incidents 
Representing CPS requires explicitly representing the 
interplay between digital and physical spaces. To achieve 
this aim, it is necessary to represent the main elements 
composing a CPS, their relationships and dynamics. 
Elements composing a CPS could be physical devices (e.g., 
HVAC, laptops), locations (e.g., the server room), digital 
processes (e.g., temperature control process), and agents. 
Relationships between these elements might be related to 
physical containment (e.g., the server room contains the 
HVAC) or digital containment (e.g., the temperature control 
process is executing on a server). Other relationships might 
be related to physical connectivity (e.g., a room is connected 
to another through a door) or digital connectivity (e.g., a 
laptop is connected to the installation bus). Dynamics are 
changes in the relationships between the elements caused by 
the execution of actions by agents. For example, the offender 
can establish physical connectivity between her laptop and 
the smart lights (e.g., she connects a microcontroller device 
to the smart lights). Explicit representation of the interplay 
can facilitate reasoning aimed to answer investigative 
questions, such as “how was the offender able to reach the 
HVAC?”. In our example, an adequate representation of the 
interplay could help identify physical connectivity between 
smart lights and HVAC devices through the installation bus 
as a possible path to reach the HVAC. However, the 
difficulty lies in identifying spatial relationships (e.g., 
containment, connectivity) among elements and their 
dynamics, since CPS are a fairly new application domain 
providing emergent interactions between their components. 
Pasquale et al. [11] have suggested that an explicit 
representation of the interplay of both digital and physical 
spaces can be used to engineer adaptive security systems. 
They propose topology as a key aspect to represent various 
spatial relationships such as containment and proximity. In a 
more recent work, Tsigkanos et al. [12] propose the use of 
Bigraphical Reactive Systems (BRS) to represent the 
topology. They apply model checking to reason about how 
the evolution of such topological relationships could 
determine security threats at runtime. This work could be 
used to identify potential digital evidence at runtime. This 
can be accomplished by identifying the elements of a CPS 
involved in the evolution of a topological configuration 
leading to an incident and their interactions. 
Identification of an incident from the analysis of the CPS 
dynamics is likely to be intractable. This is due to the many 
different ways in which the elements composing a CPS and 
their relationships can evolve. Therefore, a representation of 
the CPS should be complemented with a high-level 
representation of the actions characterizing incidents and the 
involved elements (e.g., targeted assets, resources, offenders) 
of a CPS. The model should be general enough to allow 
application of the represented actions to different CPS. In our 
example, we could consider the incident represented as: 
However, the challenge is to identify the common 
actions, elements, and relationships, which can be 
represented in an abstract way and applied to different 
situations. Moreover, producing a catalog of high-level 
incidents for CPS is challenging because knowledge 
regarding how cyber-physical incidents occur and their 
consequences is scarce [13]. Existing resources are 
developed and used for investigating primarily the digital 
space. Wood et al. [14] developed forensic datasets for 
educational purposes that include different scenarios 
involving different digital devices (e.g., mobile phones), 
which resemble real incident cases. However, the datasets 
include only activities performed on digital devices. 
B. Event Reconstruction 
Event reconstruction refers to the identification of the 
sequence of events that led to an incident [15]. In this phase, 
hypotheses regarding what happened are developed based on 
collected evidence. 
A challenge for event reconstruction is cross-correlating 
collected evidence i.e. linkability. In CPS, physical processes 
operate in continuous time and space, while computational 
reach floor of targeted element => connect to 
installation bus through smart device => locate HVAC 
co-located with target device => compromise HVAC 
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processes operate in discrete time and space. In our example, 
temperature adjusting process in the server room operates in 
continuous time and space, while data generation and 
logging is done in discrete time and space. Thus, techniques 
for event reconstruction should take into account the 
different types of events (digital and physical) and their 
properties. Another challenge is the generation of large 
number of plausible hypotheses. This is due to the interplay 
in CPS and extended attack surface, which means that one 
event can be caused by potentially many elements 
(computational, communication, or physical). Thus, efficient, 
accurate, and precise event reconstruction approaches are 
required to minimize the number of generated hypotheses to 
relevant-plausible ones. 
Gladyshev and Patel [16] propose a finite state machine 
(FSM) approach to formalize hypothesis generation of an 
incident in digital investigations. Formalization is done 
through defining the event reconstruction problem as finding 
all possible explanations for a given evidential statement 
with respect to the FSM. James et al. [17] try to address the 
state explosion problem by converting the FSM into 
deterministic FSM which reduces the size of the state 
machine. However, it is still a problem for real incidents 
where many complex events take place, thus, it is not 
applicable for such cases. Khan et al. [18] propose the use of 
artificial neural networks to handle large data generated in an 
incident to reconstruct the timeline of events. A limitation of 
this work is admissibility of results, since some parameters 
used in the learning step are unknown, as stated by the 
authors. 
C. Forensic Readiness Requirements 
Forensic readiness is particularly important for CPS 
because some of the data produced by the devices composing 
a CPS might be volatile or tampered with. This might depend 
on the fact that some devices are resource-constrained, might 
be shut down, or lack security measures. For example, 
temperature sensors have limited resources; hence, data 
generated by them are kept for a short period and then 
deleted from the devices. So, in our example, the 
investigators might not be able to know the temperature 
before or during the incident if temperature measurements 
were not collected proactively. Thus, investigators would not 
be able to support or refute the hypothesis that the rise in the 
room’s temperature was the cause of the servers’ failure. In 
addition, offenders might tamper with generated data to hide 
their traces and/or mislead investigations. In our example, 
the offender tampered with the temperature data sent to 
control processes to hide any increase in the temperature. 
Consequently, misleading investigators to believe that the 
servers were damaged because of a hardware failure. 
To support forensic readiness, it is necessary to explicitly 
elicit and manage forensic readiness requirements. Some of 
these requirements prescribe to collect and store data 
representing the occurrence of events related to offender’s 
actions performed during potential incidents. Eliciting 
forensic readiness requirements is challenging because the 
unusual interactions between events in both the digital and 
physical spaces make it difficult to identify data to be 
collected proactively. For our example, this data could be 
control commands issued to the HVAC through the 
installation bus, and/or temperature measurements in the 
server room. 
Forensic readiness requirements also need to be traded 
off with other requirements. In particular, high availability 
requirement of the HVAC suggests that evidence collection 
and storage activities should be minimally intrusive and be 
performed while the device is operating, because it cannot be 
shut down. Moreover, CPS can generate large and 
heterogeneous data. Therefore, preserving any data produced 
by the CPS devices is infeasible due to the long time that 
such data will require to be analyzed during an investigation. 
Pasquale et al. [19] propose an evidence collection 
approach aimed to adaptively identify relevant evidence that 
should be collected proactively by IaaS (Infrastructure as a 
Service) cloud service providers. This evidence is identified 
from potential attack scenarios that may exploit well known 
vulnerabilities, such as those documented in the Common 
Vulnerabilities Exposures CVE dictionary. However, the 
focus of the work is on the digital space and digital 
investigations, and therefore does not consider the interplay 
between the physical and digital spaces. 
Taylor et al. [20] propose a general process for eliciting 
forensic readiness requirements from forensic policies. Such 
polices specify what events and related data need to be 
managed. Forensics policies are identified by selecting the 
digital assets to be protected, performing risk assessment, 
excluding unworthy assets for prosecution, and identifying 
related data. However, this approach is not automated. 
Furthermore, it is not tailored to incidents occurring in CPS 
as it does not consider events determined by the interplay 
between cyber and physical spaces. 
The requirements engineering community has 
demonstrated an increasing interest [21] in supporting 
incidents investigations. For example, in the context of social 
media incident investigations, Tun et al. [22] identify three 
main requirements related to evidence collection: 
maintaining privacy, continuity, and integrity of digital 
evidence. Similarly, Gray et al. [23] have proposed a 
technique to assess risks that local password managers can 
bring when maintaining integrity and authenticity of 
passwords. This technique could be applied to other sources 
of evidence to ensure integrity and authenticity of the data 
preserved proactively. However, none of this work has 
proposed a framework to elicit forensic readiness 
requirements nor has addressed the implementation of such 
requirements in cyber-physical systems. 
IV. TOWARDS A SOLUTION 
In this paper we begin to support engineering forensic-
ready cyber-physical systems by suggesting a systematic 
approach to elicit and manage forensic readiness 
requirements. In particular, our approach supports the 
identification of what evidence should be collected and 
when, which may also help investigators formulate incident 
hypotheses and perform event reconstruction. Our solution 
builds on two key modeling activities: i) modeling cyber-
physical incidents and ii) modeling the CPS in which these 
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incidents can occur, including the interplay between CPS 
elements. 
Modeling cyber-physical incidents requires representing 
the activities performed by the victim and the offender(s), as 
well as other concepts such as location, which might better 
specify the incident activities. A simplified version of the 
meta-model representing cyber-physical incidents is shown 
in Fig. 2. This version does not include entities and 
attributes, such as crime motives and goals, because they are 
not fundamental to describe our solution. The meta-model 
was implemented as an Eclipse plugin publicly available1. 
To achieve this aim, first we build on the concept of 
“Crime Script” [24]. This is widely used in criminology to 
describe the sequence of activities of a physical incident, 
such as subway mugging. In particular, we extracted 
primary, secondary and additional entities. Primary entities 
are those represented in all crime script models published in 
the literature. Examples of primary entities are the crime 
script itself. This includes a set of scenes, which are the 
settings in which certain activities take place (e.g., 
preparation scene). Each scene in turn includes a set of 
activities an agent performs during the incident. Secondary 
entities are those mentioned - implicitly or explicitly - in 
most of the models published in the literature [25][26]. These 
are used to relate an activity to the agent performing it 
(victim or offender). Additional entities and relationships are 
those we included in our meta-model to represent domain-
specific entities of cyber-physical incidents, such as actors, 
assets, resources and locations. These entities are abstract 
and can be extended by specific entities represented in the 
model of the CPS, such as specific digital (HVAC software) 
and physical locations (e.g., the server room) and assets. 
 In the meta-model, an asset is an entity that can be 
harmed in an incident. Cyber asset can be any data that is 
stored on an electronic device or being transmitted over a 
network. Physical asset is a physical entity such as a server. 
A location represents a place where an activity or a sequence 
                                                          
1tinyurl.com/h2qr87x 
of activities of a scene is performed. Physical location is a 
real world location (e.g., a room) where an activity or a 
sequence of activities of a scene takes place. Cyber location 
represents a place in the cyber space such as an IP address, a 
forum, or a folder in a computer. An actor represents an 
individual who performs an activity, and can be the offender 
or the victim. A resource represents a tool needed to perform 
an activity. Physical resource refers to physical tool used by 
an offender in an incident (e.g., laptop). Cyber resource 
represents software tools that an offender can use to assist 
them in an incident (e.g., malware). 
The meta-model has the potential to provide a systematic 
and rich representation of cyber-physical incidents, since it 
encompasses not only the activities of an incident but also 
related elements and relationships in the digital and physical 
spaces (e.g., location, assets, and actors), that were 
underrepresented in the original use of the Crime Scripts. 
Moreover, the possibility to extend abstract entities with 
domain-specific entities identified from the representation of 
the CPS makes our meta-model extensible and general 
enough to be applied to different types of CPS. 
We aim to use the primary and the additional entities of 
the crime-script meta-model to instantiate general incident 
templates providing a high-level, domain independent 
representation of a cyber-physical incident. An incident 
template for our example is shown in Fig. 3. We 
subsequently aim to plug concrete domain-dependent entities 
depending on the specific cyber-physical system of interest 
to identify whether an incident is feasible in a specific CPS 
and - if so - how it can occur. 
We also suggest the explicit representation of CPS 
topology and its dynamics in order to model the interplay. 
Topology refers to the spatial relationships among elements, 
which include containment and connectivity. We propose 
such an explicit representation and reasoning about the 
topology of a CPS, since it provides a way to better 
understand the cause-effect relationships between different 
elements in the digital and physical spaces. In our example, 
the topology of the digital and physical spaces can be 
represented as shown in Fig. 4. The floor contains server 
room, toilet, and control room. Server room contains servers, 
HVAC, and fire detector. The toilet contains smart lights. 
Control room contains workstation. The HVAC, fire detector 
and smart lights are physically connected to each other 
through the installation bus. The HVAC, fire detector and 
smart lights are digitally connected to each other and to 
control processes through the bus network. The Workstation 
Figure 2.  Simplified version of the meta-model of cyber-physical 
incidents. 
Figure 3.  Partial incident template based on the meta-model. 
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is digitally connected to the control processes and database 
through the IP network. 
The topology representation in Fig. 4 can be reasoned 
about to answer questions such as “how was the offender 
able to reach the HVAC?”. The answer to this question 
would be all possible paths that the analysis of the topology 
can find. For example, it finds the following paths: 
The analysis of the full topology of a CPS could 
potentially return a large number of possible paths, since, as 
we explained in section III.A, there are many different ways 
in which the elements composing a CPS can interact. 
However, not all paths found have the same significance. 
Some paths might not lead to an incident, so, there is no need 
to analyze them. Some paths might have a very low 
probability of being exploited; hence, they should be given a 
lower priority. There might only be part of the paths that 
require close analysis. Therefore, in order to identify which 
paths are more important, we need to generate concrete 
cyber-physical incident instances. These incident instances 
can be used to identify which cyber-physical paths have 
higher probability of being exploited than others. For 
example, the incident template shown in Fig. 3 and the 
topology representation in Fig. 4 can be used to produce the 
partial incident instance shown in Fig. 5. 
Analyzing this incident and the three generated paths 
would provide information that path 3 is the path that the 
offender most likely exploited (or might exploit), in this 
case, since path 3 and the incident instance identify more 
common elements (e.g., toilet, smart lights). 
We intend to use the meta-model to build cyber-physical 
incident templates. Moreover, we intend to use appropriate 
modeling formalisms [6] to model the CPS topology and its 
dynamics. We will use the model of the topology and the 
incident templates to support forensic readiness and event 
reconstruction activities. In forensic readiness, we plan to 
develop analysis techniques that generate potential incident 
instances. Incident instances can be used to identify potential 
digital evidence by extracting relevant elements such as 
targeted assets, and location. For example, we can analyze 
the partial incident instance shown in Fig. 5 to extract 
elements such as the smart light and KNX installation bus. 
These might constitute potential evidence sources from 
which data should be proactively collected. Additionally, 
when to start collecting data can be identified incident 
instances. For example, collecting data from the KNX 
installation bus can start when a device is connected to the 
bus, or when one of the connected devices (e.g., the smart 
light) becomes offline. 
In event reconstruction, we intend to develop analysis 
techniques that reason about the representation of the 
topology, potential incident instances, and collected evidence 
about the incident, to generate closely-relevant and plausible 
hypotheses about what happened. Generated hypotheses can 
help identify evidence that can support or refute them by 
extracting information from the incident instances such as 
resources used. For example, in the partial incident instance 
shown in Fig. 5, combining the elements toilet and smart 
light can provide investigators with clues on where and what 
to look for to extract evidence. 
It is worth mentioning that incomplete information and 
uncertainty in incident templates and instances are expected. 
On the one hand, it might be the case that the incident 
templates created do not contain all possible activities that 
can lead to an incident. So, continuous updating of the 
templates is required to include any missing activities that 
are discovered from investigating various incidents. On the 
other hand, an activity in an incident template can be 
interpreted in various ways by incident instances, or it can 
have no interpretations. Therefore, we will explore ways to 
assess the likelihood of different interpretations of an 
incident activity and the reasons why an activity cannot be 
performed in the cyber-physical space. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we argued that cyber-physical incidents 
should be investigated differently from traditional 
investigations. This is due to the interplay between digital 
and physical spaces that CPS inhabit, and the consequent 
extended attack surface. We discussed software engineering 
Path 1: enter floor => enter server room => physically reach 
the HVAC 
Path 2: enter floor => enter control room => connect digitally 
to control processes using the workstation => digitally reach 
the HVAC through control processes 
Path 3: enter floor => enter toilet => physically connect to 
smart lights => digitally reach HVAC through bus network 
 Figure 4.  Topology representation of the digital and physical spaces in 
the motivating example. 
Figure 5.  Partial incident instance. 
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challenges in relation to the interplay in CPS. These 
challenges include the representation and reasoning about the 
interplay and incidents, event reconstruction and forensic 
readiness requirements. We proposed two potential modeling 
components of a solution to support investigations of cyber-
physical incidents: a meta-model to represent cyber-physical 
incidents and the explicit representation of topology. These 
could be used in the forensic readiness phase to identify 
potential incidents, and subsequently potential evidence to 
collect. Moreover, they could be used in the event 
reconstruction phase to generate hypotheses about what 
happened, and what evidence could support/refute these 
hypotheses. 
In future work, we intend to identify suitable modeling 
formalisms to represent the topology of digital and physical 
spaces and their dynamics. We also need to develop analysis 
techniques that take advantage of the meta-model and 
topology representation to support forensic readiness and 
event reconstruction phases. Finally, we need to evaluate our 
work by creating prognostic and diagnostic scenarios to test 
our techniques, and then consider ways of obtaining some 
metrics such as error rates for identifying potential incidents 
and error rates for generated hypotheses. 
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